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This paper analyzes the e⁄ectiveness of three di⁄erent types of education policies:
tuition subsidies (broad based, merit based, and ￿ at tuition), grant subsidies (broad
based and merit based), and loan limit restrictions. We develop a quantitative theory
of college within the context of general equilibrium overlapping generations economy.
College is modeled as a multi-period risky investment with endogenous enrollment,
time-to-degree, and dropout behavior. Tuition costs can be ￿nanced using federal
grants, student loans, and working while at college. We show that our model accounts
for the main statistics regarding education (enrollment rate, dropout rate, and time to
degree) while matching the observed aggregate wage premiums. Our model predicts
that broad based tuition subsidies and grants increase college enrollment. However, due
to the correlation between ability and ￿nancial resources most of these new students are
from the lower end of the ability distribution and eventually dropout or take longer than
average to complete college. Merit based education policies counteract this adverse
selection problem but at the cost of a muted enrollment response. Our last policy
experiment highlights an important interaction between the labor-supply margin and
borrowing. A signi￿cant decrease in enrollment is found to occur only when borrowing
constraints are severely tightened and the option to work while in school is removed.
This result suggests that previous models that have ignored the student￿ s labor supply
when analyzing borrowing constraints may be insu¢ cient.
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11 Introduction
Public policy as it relates to the subsidizing of higher education has been a focal point of
empirical and theoretical economists for some time. Becker (1964) points out that young
individuals often lack adequate amounts of capital to pledge to private investors. Without
government intervention only individuals with access to su¢ cient resources would be able
to pursue higher education. This observation has driven macroeconomist to understand
the role education subsidies play in reducing economic inequality.1 At the same time, the
empirical microeconometric literature has consistently debated the existence and magnitude
of borrowing constraints as well as using new data from various educational programs in
order to identify the most e⁄ective policy tools for enhancing the aggregate skill level in
the economy. The goal of this paper is to make a ￿rst step in combining these interrelated
research agendas in order to understand the microeconomic mechanism through which higher
education subsidies work within the context of a macroeconomic model. The key elements of
the college investment process are isolated and examined in an attempt to better understand
the interaction between available ￿nancing options and the decision to enroll in college and
complete college in a timely manner. Rather than using a welfare criteria for selecting the
optimal policy, we focus on discussing the mechanism through which each policy leads to
the predicted results.
Our quantitative theory of college behavior and ￿nancial aid features endogenous enroll-
ment, time-to-degree, and dropout decisions made by individuals that di⁄er in their innate
ability and initial wealth. College is modeled as a multi-period risky investment that requires
a commitment of both physical resources and time in order to complete. Risk is introduced
primarily through uncertainty over ones college ability which we correlate with innate ability
according to micro-level education data. The same data is used to account for the empir-
ical correlation between innate ability and available ￿nancial resources, a feature absent in
Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2006). Students learn their college ability after enrolling
in college but before dropping out. This implies that their is an option value embedded in
college as argued by Comay, Melnik, and Pollatschek (1973), Manski (1989), and Altonji
(1991). Our model is unique in that we model all three major college decisions as the result
of optimal decision making on the part of rational individuals. We feel that allowing for such
intricate college behavior is necessary for studying policy proposals designed to speci￿cally
alter these three behavioral margins. In contrast to our research, the existing literature most
frequently accounts for dropouts with the introduction of an exogenous "dropout shock" as
1There has also been an extensive literature in macroeconomics and growth theory that tries to understand
the role of human capital acquisition as an engine of growth. See Uzawa (1965) and Lucas (1988) among
others.
2in Caucutt and Kumar (2003) or Akyol and Athreya (2005). To our knowledge no one has
accounted for the time-to-degree dimension of the college investment process. In order to
account for important general equilibrium e⁄ects we embed the college investment decision
within an overlapping generations production economy.
The labor supply of both full-time worker and college students in our model is endogenous.
While allowing for college students to work during their college years greatly increases the
computational complexity of our model, we feel that it is essential for understanding the
in￿ uence of borrowing constraints. A report from National Center for Education Statistics
reveals that the percentage of full-time students employed increased from 34 percent to 49
percent between 1970 and 2005.2 In addition, the percent of full-time students working 20
or more hours per week more than doubled over the same period, increasing from 14 percent
in 1970 to 30 percent in 2005. If borrowing constraints begin to bind labor income becomes
a viable ￿nancing alternative, but only at the cost of a reduction in the amount of time
remaining for studying. In addition, college students may choose to work only a few hours
in order to reduce the burden associated with large student loan payments in the event of
dropping out. In the absence of this mechanism low income students would be forced to
rely solely on grants and loans to ￿nance the cost of education. This has the potential to
overestimate the sensitivity to proposed subsidy policies.
The model accounts for the main statistics regarding education such as enrollment rate,
dropout rate, and time to degree while matching the observed aggregate wage premiums
consistent with the labor and macro literature. We use our model to study three types of
education policies: tuition subsidies (broad based, merit based, and ￿ at tuition), grant subsi-
dies (broad based and merit based), and loan limit restrictions (with and without endogenous
in-school labor supply). The e⁄ectiveness of some of these programs depends in part on the
quantitative importance of the income and substitution e⁄ects, as well as the general equi-
librium e⁄ects that determine the skill premium. Tuition subsidies e⁄ectively change the
relative price (cost) of education. At the individual level the substitution and income e⁄ects
work together to encourage students to register for more credits. Enrollment increases only
moderately because poorer students cannot a⁄ord to put forth the e⁄ort required to reap
the bene￿ts of cheaper tuition. Grants increase the disposable income of students. However,
the pure income e⁄ect of grants does not necessarily incentivize all students to signi￿cantly
tilt their expenditures towards education as they also value the consumption of goods and
leisure.
Also driving a number of the model￿ s predictions is the correlation between ability and
wealth. We ￿nd that broad based tuition and grant policies cannot simultaneously increase
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3enrollment and reduce dropouts because students incentivized to enroll are from the lower
end of the ability and wealth distribution. These results are consistent with those of Cameron
and Heckman (1998) who ￿nd that failure to account for ability heterogeneity leads to the
biased conclusion that policy interventions late in the life-cycle are e⁄ective at raising skill
levels. This type of adverse selection is also present in Akyol and Athreya (2005). Merit
based programs and ￿ at tuition policies serve as a screening mechanism. As such, they are
successful at signi￿cantly reducing dropouts but only marginally improving enrollment.
Allowing for endogenous college labor supply has important implications for understand-
ing the role of borrowing constraints. Interestingly, we concluded that borrowing constraints
must be severely tightened and working in college prohibited for there to be a sizeable a⁄ect
on enrollment. These ￿ndings are a generalization of those found in Keane (2002) who uses
a stylized example to shows that while borrowing constraints may not impact the enrollment
decision, they do a⁄ect the work behavior of students. The dropout rate is also reduced when
working is removed from the student￿ s choice set and the magnitude of borrowing constraints
increased. This is a result of two reinforcing e⁄ects. On the one hand removing the work
decision forces more time to be devoted to studying (and leisure). Additionally, the inability
to work prohibits some poorer students from enrolling in school. Since wealth and ability are
correlated these students were also those that were most likely to dropout. While borrowing
constraints have only a small e⁄ect on the enrollment decision, they provide an important
insurance mechanism for currently enrolled students. The model shows that the majority of
college students that are subject to borrowing constraints have already completed at least
two years of college. Once the borrowing constraint binds, the students have to rely on labor
income to fund the remaining years of college, hence the increase in the time to degree.
When students are not allowed to work while in college (or have severe restrictions) the time
to completion decreases substantially.
In the only empirical study addressing the time-to-degree dimension of college, Bound,
Lovenheim, and Turner (2006) have found that during the time period covering the high
school graduating classes of 1972 and 1992 the percent of students receiving a degree in 4
years fell from 57.6 percent to 44.0 percent, and that the average time-to-degree increased
by more than 4 months. Their conclusion is that the increase is most likely being driven
by congestion in the college process due to inadequate institutional resources. Another
possibility not tested in their paper is that increases in the availability of ￿nancial aid
encourage students to remain in school longer. While time-to-degree is a⁄ected in all of
the experiments that we run, the e⁄ect is quite small. However, our model is benchmarked
towards the end of the period highlighted in their study. It is possible that any increase in
time-to-degree caused by the introduction of ￿nancial aid has already occurred.
4Dynamic general equilibrium models are arguably the most well suited for studying na-
tional policy initiatives that have aggregate e⁄ects, although the empirical econometric ap-
proach is by far the most popular. This is because aggregate e⁄ects in-turn impact the
response to the policy itself (e.g. national student loan program). Heckman, Lochner, and
Taber (1998) point out that most empirical studies neglect the general equilibrium e⁄ects
on wages and taxes. Thus, it is misleading to extrapolate the results from a local policy
change to the national level. Using a general equilibrium overlapping generations model,
Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) ￿nd that neglecting the general equilibrium e⁄ects on
wages and taxes overestimates the enrollment response to a tuition subsidy by more than ten
times. Their model allows for the decomposition of welfare e⁄ects for students a⁄ected by
the policy. Those induced into college after the tuition subsidy or those that stay in college
after the change are better o⁄, but those that would not go to college with or without the
subsidy or those that do not enroll because of the policy are worse o⁄. This is because taxes
must be raised to ￿nance the subsidy and this reduces after-tax wages.
Our paper is most closely related to the work of Caucutt and Kumar (2003), Akyol and
Athreya (2005), and Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2006). However, there are signi￿cant
di⁄erences between the objectives of these papers and our own. Caucutt and Kumar (2003)
and Akyol and Athreya (2005) use overlapping generations models to study the e⁄ect current
policies have on inequality, as well as to rationalize the level of higher education subsidies
found in the U.S. and other developed countries. Both studies conclude that increasing higher
education subsidies beyond current levels contribute little to increasing welfare. Caucutt
and Kumar (2003) also ￿nd quantitatively important e¢ ciency e⁄ects depending on the
type of policy instituted by the government. Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2006) examine
the education process beginning in high school and ending in college. Their focus is on
addressing the impact of one speci￿c type of education policy, tuition subsidies, has on
economic inequality.
While the relationship between inequality and education subsidies is important, our ob-
jective is to understand the consumer mechanisms at work that determines the e⁄ectiveness
of various policies. By formulating college as a complex, multi-period investment we are able
to delve deeper into understanding the trade-o⁄s of many types of policy proposals, not just
one. Understanding how di⁄erent policies a⁄ect the enrollment and completion decisions
of students is essential for drawing conclusion of how and why education subsidies a⁄ect
economic equity.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a general and
detailed description of the model. A stationary equilibrium for the economy is de￿ned in
section 3. Section 4 reviews the parametrization of the benchmark economy. The estimation
5of the benchmark economy as well as an evaluation of the model is presented in section 5.
A discussion of our policy experiments can be found in section 6. Section 7 concludes.
2 Economic Environment
2.1 General Description
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals that are economically
active up to period J at which time they enter retirement. At the beginning of the ￿rst period
of life each individual draws an innate ability and asset position from a joint distribution.
With this information individuals decide to enroll in college or enter the work force as a full-
time high school educated worker. The option to enroll in college is only available during
the ￿rst period of life. To graduate from college a student must successfully complete a ￿xed
minimum number of credits within three periods.
After enrolling in college a new student decides on the number of credits to register
for and the amount of e⁄ort to exert in turning registered credits into completed credits.
Students fund their purchase of registered credits and per-period consumption by drawing
on four resources: labor income earned from endogenously supplying labor, student loans,
initial assets, and government provided grants. The total cost of obtaining an education is
a function of the number of credits registered for.
At the beginning of the second period each college student draws a new college ability
from a conditional distribution. Upon learning their new college ability each student decides
to drop out of college and enter the work force as a full-time worker or continue their
education. Dropping out is a nonreversible decisions and the return to a partial education is
uncertain. Students that decide to continue in college face the same problem as ￿rst period
students, but particular students in the second period may di⁄er in their college ability, the
number of credits they have completed, and their current asset position. There is no more
uncertainty over ability after the second period.
Students that have satis￿ed the minimum college degree requirement in two periods begin
the third period as college educated workers. Students that have not completed the required
minimum number of credits face the same problem as an agent beginning the second period.
After making their dropout/continuation decision students choose registered credits and
consumption expenditures, as well as how much to borrow and work. Should a student fail
to complete their degree by the end of the third period they are e⁄ectively a dropout.
Upon entering the labor market by either forgoing college, dropping out, or graduating,
workers choose how much labor to supply at the given education and age speci￿c wage rate,
how much to consume, and tomorrow￿ s asset position. Earnings are subject to nondistor-
6tionary taxation. We assume that the repayment of student loans begins immediately after
leaving school and that only a fraction of debt incurred in school may be rolled-over each
period. Thus, because no agents in our model begin life with a negative asset position, those
individuals that never attend college are subject to a strict borrowing constraint. Extending
the credit limits in this manner allows us to summarizes the idea that more skilled agents
usually face looser credit constraints without having to endogenize borrowing constraints. A
similar approach can be found in Akyol and Athreya (2005).
At each date there is a single output good produced in the economy using a constant
returns to scale production technology that is a function of aggregate capital and labor.
Aggregate labor is comprised of age and education speci￿c labor inputs. The government
runs a balanced budget tax and transfer educational grant program. Our analysis only
focuses on a stationary equilibrium where all the aggregates and prices are time invariant.
2.2 Demographics
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals that are indexed by
their age, j 2 J = f1;2;:::;Jg: Each agent is economically active until age J ￿ 1; after
which they enter retirement at age J: Consumers are considered "young" from birth up to
age jo; and thereafter until retirement they are characterized as "old." There is no survival
uncertainty.3 For convenience the total measure of agents in the economy is normalized to
unity. We assume that each newborn population grows relative to the previous generation at
a constant rate ￿ each period. The cohort shares f￿jg
J
j=1 are computed as ￿j = ￿j￿1=(1+￿);
where
PJ
j=1 ￿j = 1:
2.3 Firms
Firms operate a constant returns to scale technology to produce the only output good used
for consumption and capital. While production depends on aggregate capital K and labor
N in the standard Cobb-Douglas fashion, it also depends on two CES sub-aggregates of high
school educated labor H and college educated labor G. We modify the production function
used by Card and Lemieux (2001) to the study changes in the skill premium across age
groups by incorporating capital as a factor of production.4 Speci￿cally, output is determined
3The survival probabilities for individuals of age 65 and less are su¢ ciently close to one that we may
abstract from modelling mortality risk and the structure of annuity markets.
4They argue that this form of production function is consistent with two observations: The ￿rst one is
that the gap in average earnings between workers with a college degree and those with only high school
diploma rose about 25 percent in the mid 1970￿ s to a 40 percent in 1998. The second one is that most of the
rise can be attributed to the increase in the college wage premium of the younger cohorts.
7according to:
Y = f (K;N) = AK
￿N
1￿￿; (1)






where AH and AG represent the technology e¢ ciency parameters of high school and college
graduates, respectively. The labor input from high school and college graduates is computed



















where ￿j and  j are the e¢ ciency parameters for age group j high school educated workers
Hj and college educated workers Gj; respectively. The parameters ￿ and ’ are functions
of the elasticity of substitution between high school and college workers ￿E; and between
di⁄erent aged workers within education groups ￿A; respectively. Speci￿cally, the relationships
are ￿ = 1 ￿ 1=￿E and ’ = 1 ￿ 1=￿A: Because we only model two general age groups, young

















In equations (5) and (6) subscripts refer to the two age groups from which labor is hired.
Perfect competition requires workers and capital to be paid their marginal products. The
implied equilibrium factor prices are:
w
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To distinguish between the wages of workers with di⁄erent education levels the superscripts
h and g in equations (7)￿(10) are used to identify high school educated workers and college
educated workers, respectively.
Since we explicitly model the college dropout decision we must to assign a wage rate for
the students pursuing this option. Kane and Rouse (1995) ￿nd that on average those that
attended two year colleges earned approximately 10 percent more than those with just a
high school education. To capture this partial return to completing some higher education
the wages of college dropouts are modeled as a linear combination of high school educated





i + (1 ￿ ￿)w
g
i; i = o;y; (11)
where ￿ 2 (0;1) dictates the return to partial education.
2.4 Consumers
Consumers preferences are de￿ned over consumption c; leisure l; and retirement assets aJ









where ￿ is the subjective discount factor and the function ￿(￿) is the agent￿ s value function
upon retirement. Because there is no uncertainty after the ￿nal period, or more generally that
all uncertainty is iid; the use of a terminal value function is valid.5 The partial derivatives
of the utility function u : R2 ! R satisfy ui > 0; uii < 0; and uij > 0 and are consistent with
the Inada conditions. The retirement value function ￿ : R ! R is C2 and strictly concave.
Speci￿c functional forms for the per-period utility function and retirement value function
are discussed in the parameterization section.
Upon ￿rst entering the economy new high school graduates are di⁄erentiated by their
initial asset position and innate ability (a0;￿h) which are drawn from a joint probability
distribution ￿(a0;￿h): The manner in which initial assets and ability are determined is an
5See Merton (1971).
9extremely important feature of the model. In abstracting away from the pre-college portion
of a student￿ s life we have neglected important socioeconomic in￿ uences that invariably
determine the college preparedness of an agent, as well as the ￿nancial resources available
to potentially college bound students. For example, wealthier families may be able to invest
more heavily in their child￿ s secondary education which leads to a correlation between family
wealth and college preparedness. Restuccia and Urruria (2004) use a quantitative model of
intergenerational human capital transmission and ￿nd that approximately one-half of the
intergenerational correlation in earning is accounted for by the parents investment in early
education. In addition, wealthier families may o⁄er more ￿nancial support to their child to
go to college. The potential correlation between wealth and ability, and then wealth and
￿nancial support implies a correlation between a student￿ s college ￿nancial resources and
their ability. The joint probability distribution allows us account for this correlation which
e⁄ectively summarizes the socioeconomic in￿ uences prior to college. The estimation of this
distribution is discussed in depth when we present the parameterization of the benchmark
economy later in the paper.
In the ￿rst period of life newborns are o⁄ered the opportunity to enroll in college or enter
the labor market with a high school education. As a result of this decision we can classify
each agent as being in one of two categories: student, or a full-time worker. We present the
problem of the college student ￿rst followed by the problem of the worker.
2.5 College Student Problem
College is modeled as a multi-period risky investment that requires a student to success-
fully complete a minimum of credits x within three periods to graduate. Students progress
through college by combining their ability ￿ 2 ￿; e⁄ort e; and registered credits e x using an
education technology, Q(￿;e;e x). The education technology is a non-linear function dictating
the production of completed credits x according to:
x = Q(￿;e;e x) = ￿e xe
￿; 0 < ￿ < 1:
Some features of this technology deserve special attention since our approach of modelling
schooling decisions through college credits and not human capital is non standard. We choose
to model progression through college in terms of credits instead of human capital in order to
more accurately incorporate the cost of education into the model using empirical data. The
speci￿ed technology is multiplicative in ability, registered credits, and e⁄ort. In addition,
the marginal returns to investment in education are constant in the ￿rst two factors and
diminishing in e⁄ort. The multiplicative structure implies that students with higher ability
10are more productive at the margin in terms of completing all college credits, and it is not
just a scaling factor in the level of produced credits. Students can a⁄ect the production of
completed credits by choosing the number of registered credits and/or supplying more e⁄ort.
For example, a student with low ability ￿i < ￿j can choose to register for a large number
of credits e xi > e xj and obtain the same return (in terms of completed credits) as that of
student with higher ability, but the cost in terms of tuition will be higher. The assumption
that higher-ability types are more productive is common in the human capital literature, see
Becker (1993). An alternative mechanism for low ability students is to increase the time e⁄ort
in school, but it has a utility cost since an increase in e⁄ort reduces the time available for
leisure and work. However, the education technology exhibits diminishing returns to e⁄ort
following the work of Ben-Porath (1967):6 Despite the apparent di⁄erences, the college credit
function is a version of the frequently used human capital accumulation equation, where the
stock of human capital is replaced with the agent￿ s credit stock.As mentioned earlier, allowing
the labor supply of college students to be determined endogenously addresses a previously
neglected interaction with the student￿ s choice of debt. It also serves another important
function related to the riskiness of college. In the presence of uncertainty over the ability
to complete college students may choose to hedge the risk by substituting labor income for
debt. This further increases the chances of failure as time spent working may be drawn
away from school. Students from the lower end of the asset distribution are particularly
vulnerable because we correlate ability with initial assets.The structure of the model allows
us to exploit the recursive nature of the consumer￿ s problem. In addition, we break the
agent￿ s optimization problem into distinct time periods in order to make explicit how the
agent￿ s information set and trade-o⁄s change. Each agent has a total of ￿ve state variables:
assets a; current ability ￿; completed college credits x; age j; and education indicator s:
The education indicator state s lies in the set S = fh;d;c;gg where h refers to a high
school educated worker, d a college dropout, c an enrolled college student, and g a college
graduate. Let vs
j(a;x;￿) be the value function of an age j agent with education level s; assets
a; completed college credits x; and schooling ability ￿:7
First Period of College: Given initial assets and ability, an agent that decides to enroll
in college must choose consumption c; registered credits e x; e⁄ort e; leisure l; labor supply n;
and tomorrow￿ s asset position a0. A freshman student has an initial endowment of college
6Ben-Porath assumes that the human capital technology exhibits diminishing returns in e⁄ort and the
stock of human capital, f(h;e;￿) = ￿(he)￿. The curvature of the production function allows to characterize
interior solutions and also bounds the stock of human capital. In our model, we formalize the acquisition of
education through credits that are bounded by the minimum number of credits required to graduate.
7Writing the value function as vs
j(a;x;￿) rather than v(a;x;￿;s;j) keeps the notation compact and saves
space.
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l + e + n = 1
e x > 0; x
0 ￿ e x
The total education expenditure depends on the number of registered credits e x and the per-
credit price T . In order to ￿nance their education, students may draw on their initial assets
and three additional resources. First, students may work while in school earning a young high
school graduates wage wh
y: Second, the government provides all students with a per-period
college grant y: Students also have access to the ￿nancial market where they are permitted
to take a negative position in the only ￿nancial asset, a0 2 A up to the borrowing constraint
a2c. We allow the per-period loan limit to vary in each period of college as indicated by the
time indexing. Each agent has a time endowment normalized to the unity. During college
years this endowment can be allocated between work, e⁄ort in school, and leisure. The
last two constraints simply states that students must register for positive credits, and that
completed credits may not be greater than registered credits.
The continuation value functions for a ￿rst-year student depend whether the students
continues with their education in the following period vc
2(￿); or drops from school and joins
the labor force as a full-time worker vd
2(￿): The expectation in the continuation value is the
result of two sources of risk associated with obtaining an education. First, we assume that
after the ￿rst period of college each student￿ s college ability ￿c is randomly drawn from the
conditional distribution ￿(￿h;￿c). Once the agent￿ s college ability is determined there is no
further uncertainty over ability.8 Second, should a student choose to dropout they receive a
high school graduate￿ s wage with probability p and a college dropout￿ s wage with probability
(1 ￿ p): The uncertainty over wages enables us to easily incorporate the documented partial
return to college. Thus, the expectation in the value function is with respect to next periods
college ability ￿c and the wage a dropout will receive wd
y:
8As we discuss in greater detail when we outline our parameterization of the model, we estimate the con-
ditional probability distribution to match empirical data that indicates that successful high school students
are more likely to be successful college students.
12Second Period of College: At the beginning of the period each student draws a new
college ability type ￿c ￿ ￿(￿h j ￿c): After learning their new ability the student decides to
dropout or continue on with college. The second period college problem is similar to that
of the ￿rst period. However, the borrowing constraint in the second period is relaxed with
respect to the previous period. In addition, the student now has to weigh the option of
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c) is the value of entering the labor market in the third period as a college
graduate. The law of motion for completed credits now includes the stock of completed
credits from the previous college year x. To satisfy the graduation requirement a college
student must complete x0 ￿ x college credits. Note that the production function of credits
depends only on the realized value of college ability and is therefore independent of past
abilities. A college student is always allowed to borrow as least as much in the second period
as in the third period. This assumption allows the agent to at least roll over the previous
periods debt if a3c = a2c, and increase accumulated student loan debt if a3c < a2c: If the credit
constraint were not to be relaxed a college student at the borrowing limit during the ￿rst-
period of college would be forced to repay the principal and accrued interest (1 + r)a2c in the
third period, while only relying on labor income and grants to fund their education. Because
all ability uncertainty is resolved before the student makes any decisions, the expectation
operator is only de￿ned over the wage rate of dropouts.
Third Period of College: Students that extend their time in school into the third
period solve a slightly di⁄erent problem than in the second period. Should a student not be
able to complete x credits in the ￿nal period they are automatically classi￿ed as dropouts
as there is no further college periods. As in the second period, we allow the borrowing
constraint to change although we do not require that it allow for an increased level of debt.9
9When we estimate the benchmark economy we specify a4c < a3c < a2c so the agent may continually
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￿
l + e + n = 1
a
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e x > 0; x
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2.6 College Enrollment Decision
A newborn high school graduate with innate ability ￿h; initial assets a0; and no college
credits (x = 0) will choose to go to college when the expected discounted utility of doing so
is as least as great as the utility gain from entering the workforce as a high school educated







To compute the initial value functions it is necessary to solve the model using backward
recursion from the last period followed by the workers problem. We turn into these problems
next.
2.7 Workers
All workers solve the same general problem regardless of their path to the workforce: forgoing
college (s = h); dropping out (s = d); or graduating (s = g): After leaving school the laws of
motion for credits and ability for college students are trivially x0 = x and ￿0 = ￿, respectively,
and all the relevant educational information is summarized by the college status s; age j;
and asset position a: Workers choose consumption, tomorrow￿ s asset position, and how much
labor to supply at the given education and age speci￿c wage rate. All income is subject to
a lump-sum tax ￿: The problem of a worker in the period immediately preceding retirement
is complicated by our use of a terminal value function to model post-retirement. We present
the problem of workers aged j < J ￿ 1 ￿rst and postpone the aged J ￿ 1 worker￿ s problem
increase borrowing while in school. However in our policy experiments we investigate how restricted debt in
the third period of college a⁄ects time-to-degree.








y if j < jo
ws
o if jo ￿ j < J ￿ 1
Notice that this speci￿cation di⁄ers from the standard formulation where the pro￿le of earn-
ing changes over the life-cycle according to some hump-shaped pro￿le of exogenously speci￿ed
e¢ ciency units of labor. In the current speci￿cation the age and education heterogeneity, as
well as the evolution of the asset distribution are responsible for changes in the labor supply.
Full-time workers allocate their time endowment between leisure and work as e⁄ort in school
















jn + (1 + r)a ￿ ￿;
a
0 ￿ min[0;￿a]; ￿ 2 (0;1):
Our borrowing constraint is nonstandard and requires some discussion due to the restric-
tions we impose on student loan repayment. We assume that repayment of student loans
begins immediately after leaving school and that only a fraction, ￿ 2 (0;1); of outstanding
loans may be rolled-over each period. This prevents us from adding an additional state
variable while simultaneously approximating the repayment time period currently placed on
many student loans.10 Agents are not permitted to hold negative assets beyond what they
enter the workforce with in the form of student loans. Thus, tomorrow￿ s asset decision must
satisfy a0 ￿ min[0;￿a]: Since all agents begin life with a non-negative asset position, it
is clear that forgoing college results in a hard borrowing constraint. This speci￿cation is
equivalent to an education dependent borrowing constraint where a0
s ￿ ￿a when s = d;g
and a0
h ￿ 0:
10Under the federal student loan program the standard repayment option for Sta⁄ord loans is 10 years.
Matching this repayment length exactly would require adding the number of repayment periods remaining
as a state variable.
152.8 Retirement
Compulsory retirement occurs at age J: Because agents have utility de￿ned over terminal
assets the period J￿1 worker problem is slightly di⁄erent than the standard worker problem.





fu(c;l) + ￿(aJ)g; (17)
subject to aJ > 0 and the old worker￿ s budget constraint. Here, ￿(￿) determines the value
retirees place on assets. This allows us to abstract away from post retirement behavior which
we feel is appropriate as we are concerned with behavior extremely early in the economic
life-cycle. This is a convenient adaptation of the method used in Roussanov (2004) and
Akyol and Athreya (2006).
2.9 Government
The government runs a tax and transfer education grant program. All workers not in college
are taxed a lump-sum tax ￿ which is redistributed to college students in the form of grants y:
Our balanced budget assumption implies that in equilibrium the government￿ s tax revenue
must equal total grant expenditures. The lump-sum tax that balances the education budget









X￿Ss6=c￿J ￿j￿(da ￿ d￿ ￿ dx ￿ ds ￿ dj)
; (18)
where ￿(￿) represents the measure of households over the state space. The government
budget constraint needs to be modi￿ed when we consider tuition subsidies, or merit based
programs. However, we defer these discussions to the results section.
It can be argued that compared with a marginal income tax, our assumption of a lump-
sum tax may not accurately capture the distortionary e⁄ect taxes have on the incentive
to pursue a college education. However, given that only a small mass of the population is
receiving grants, the per-capita tax burden in this economy is likely not to have a signi￿cant
a⁄ect on the return to education. In a subsequent paper we plan to investigate this proposal
by examining the optimal tax instrument to ￿nance a publicly provided higher education
subsidy program.
162.10 College Sector
There is an extensive literature on the supply side of education. The objective of the paper is
to focus on the demand side by specifying a simple college sector that produces the credits.
We assume a competitive education sector with constant returns to scale, or linear cost
structure. Free entry in the sector ensures that pro￿ts will be zero and the price per credit
equals the marginal cost of producing credits. The advantage of this formulation is that
allows to parameterize the cost of college education as fraction of average income and it
simpli￿es an already complex model.
3 Stationary Equilibrium
To de￿ne the notion of stationary equilibrium it is useful to introduce some additional
notation. For an individual of a given age j 2 J = (1;2;:::;J) ￿ I and education status
s 2 S = (h;d;g;c); the relevant state vector in the recursive representation is denoted
by ￿s
j = (a;x;￿). Let as 2 As ￿ A; ￿ 2 ￿; x 2 X ￿ I: Notice that the set of asset
holding is conditioned buy the education status as a result of the education speci￿c borrowing
constraint. We also de￿ne ￿ = (a;x;￿;s;j) to be the state vector including the education
status and age, and ￿(￿) represents the distribution of individuals over the entire state
space.




j)g; (ii) individual decision rules for college students (s = c;d;g and j =












j)g; (iii) individual decision
rules for workers and retirees (s = h;d;g and j = 1;:::;J) that include consumption, asset
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og; (vii) education policy ￿ = f￿;yg and (viii) a stationary
population distribution f￿jg and an invariant distribution ￿(￿) of individuals over the entire
state space such that:
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j)g solve problems (17) and (18) when s = h;d;g
and j = 1;:::;J. And the college enrollment decision Ic
1(a;0;￿h) solves problem (16).






og , the representative ￿rms chooses optimally
17factors of production and prices are set to the marginal products according to (7), (8),
(9), (10), (11), and (12).













































































where d￿(￿) ￿ ￿(da ￿ d￿ ￿ dx ￿ ds ￿ dj):






















0 ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)K = f (K;N);











￿j￿(da ￿ d￿ ￿ dx ￿ ds ￿ dj);
7. Letting T : M ! M be an operator which maps the set of distributions into itself.
Aggregation requires ￿0 (￿0) = T(￿); and T be consistent with individual decisions.
We restrict the solution to equilibria that satisfy
T(￿) = ￿
There is a two remarks about the de￿nition of equilibrium. First, the labor market
18conditions are slightly more complex due to the existence of college dropouts. Recall that
there is uncertainty over the exact wage a college dropout will receive; a fraction will receive
the high school wage while the rest will receive the dropout wage. The labor supply of
dropouts earning the high school wage is aggregated into the high school labor supply. The
aggregation of the labor supply for the dropout wage earners is carried out in-line with how
the dropout wage is determined. Because we calculate the college dropout￿ s wages as a linear
combination of the wages of high school educated workers and college educated workers we
must aggregate a fraction of their labor into both education group￿ s labor supply. We weight
the labor supply of college dropouts according to the fraction of the wage which is determined
by high school and college education workers. Second, market clearing in the asset market
is determined at the point where the quantity of capital demanded by ￿rms is equal to net
resources provided by households in the form of savings. While the loan programs are usually
funded by the government, this form of lending is equivalent to the issue of government debt
that is then purchase by the households. The total magnitude of debt to issue should be
equivalent to the aggregate level of outstanding college debt.
4 Benchmark Economy
To solve the benchmark economy we must ￿rst specify our demographic assumptions, pick
functional forms for the per-period utility function and retirement value function, assign
initial assets and ability, pin down all parameters associated with the education process and
aggregate production function, as well as estimate the joint ability and asset distribution and
conditional ability distribution. The time period that we choose to use in benchmarking our
model is crucial. Beginning with the 1993-94 school year the federal student loan program
changed in three signi￿cant ways due to the 1992 Reauthorization of the Higher Education
Act (HEA92): the federal need based formula changed to allow less needy students to qualify
for need-based aid; there was a widespread increase in the availability of unsubsidized student
loans; and the nominal aggregate student loan limits increased approximately 33 percent for
dependent students and 23 percent for independent students. Data availability limitations
force us to benchmark our model to the pre-HEA92 period of the early 1990s.
We parameterize the benchmark economy in three steps. First, a number of common pa-
rameters in the model are taken directly from the literature. Second, we estimate production
e¢ ciency parameters, initial assets, borrowing limits, and the ability transition matrix using
data from the pre-HEA92 period. Third, given the parameters we found in the previous two
steps, we choose the remaining parameters so that our model replicates the economic and
educational environment as close as possible to that of the early 1990s in the U.S. while at
19the same time respecting the market clearing conditions.
4.1 Demographics
A period in this model is two years. Agents begin life at age 18. They are considered young
until age 36 (jo) at which time they become old until they enter retirement at age 66 (J):
The population growth rate ￿ is set to an annual rate of 1.20 percent.
4.2 Preferences













The per-period utility function was chosen to allow for consumption and leisure to be com-
plements, a potentially important feature of the college experience. In-line with preference
parameter values found in the life-cycle literature we set the risk aversion parameter ￿ = 2:0,
the utility weight of consumption is chosen to be ￿ = 0:33; and the agent￿ s subjective dis-
count factor is ￿ = 0:98 : The remaining parameters, ￿R; is determined in the estimation of
the benchmark economy.
4.3 Initial Ability, Initial Assets, and the Ability Transition Ma-
trix
Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2003) contend that the correlation between educational at-
tainment of parents and their children are most likely due to inherited ability and family
characteristics such as the resources to invest in education when the child is young. As
we discussed in the model description section above, the initial asset and ability state pair
(a0;￿h) essentially summarize all socioeconomic characteristics of the agent that were de-
termined prior to making the college/work decision. Thus, the parametrization of the joint
probability distribution ￿(a0;￿h) should be in-line with the empirical facts on the relation-
ship between between initial assets of young agents and their schooling ability. Previous
work by Cameron and Heckman (1998) and Black, Devereux, and Salvanes (2003) suggests
20that long-term family resources have a strong in￿ uential a⁄ect on a student￿ s ability as mea-
sured by standardized testing at the end of their high school years. In addition, Keane and
Wolpin (2001) ￿nd that parental transfers are a monotonically increasing function of the
parent￿ s education. Given the positive relationship between parental education and parental
wealth, this implies that our parameterization of the probability distribution ￿(a0;￿h) should
capture a correlation between initial assets available to agents and their innate high school
ability.
To completely characterize the ability learning process we must also estimate the ability
transition matrix ￿(￿h;￿c): It would be inappropriate to simply assume that one￿ s college
ability is independent of their high school ability. A more reasonable assumption is that
better performing high school students are more likely to perform well in college. That is,
there is persistence in ability going from high school to college. Such an assumption does not
give us any guidance on how persistent ability is however. We therefore free ourselves from
making arbitrary assumption about ￿(￿h;￿c) by estimating the ability transition matrix
using data on high school and college GPAs:
We employ the use of the 1993 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS:93)
and High School and Beyond Sophomore Cohort (HS&B) data to carry out our estimation
of the joint probability distribution ￿(a0;￿h) using a two-step procedure that naturally cor-
relates initial assets and innate ability. Neither data set contains a su¢ ciently complete
record of family income, parental contributions, and high school ability to allow us to esti-
mate ￿(a0;￿h) with one set of data. However the HS&B data does contains high school and
college GPA data, along with other control variables that enables us to estimate the ability
transition matrix ￿(￿h;￿c) with a single data set.
The probability distribution ￿(a0;￿h) is estimated as follows. In the ￿rst step we use the
NPSAS:93 data and partition family income into quintiles. For each income quintile, initial
assets are estimated as the discounted average four year family contribution for students
attending four-year institutions. In the second step, we take the HS&B data and partition
family socioeconomic status into quintiles. A kernel density of cumulative high school GPAs,
normalized to lie in the unit interval, is then estimated for each socioeconomic quintile.
Under the assumption that income and socioeconomic status are su¢ ciently correlated, this
procedure provides us with an estimate of the distribution of initial ability (as measured by
high school GPA) and initial assets (as measured by family contributions). Therefore, we
have naturally correlated assets and ability to match their empirical counterparts. Because
we normalize our measure of mass to one, the kernel density estimate provides us with
the joint probabilities for ￿(a0;￿h). We transform these estimates of initial assets into
model units by expressing them as a fraction of the wage of young college graduates in the
21benchmark model according to the corresponding ratio calculated using annual wage data
from the March CPS supplements.
The estimation of the ability transition matrix is more straight forward. Using the HS&B
data we normalize high school and college GPA to lie in the unit interval, and then parti-
tion them into quintiles. We then estimate an ordered probit to obtain the probability of
moving from high school ability quintile qi to college ability quintile qj: Our probit model
controls for numerous personal and institutional characteristics a⁄ecting college GPA, in-
cluding: selectivity of college, type of college (public or private), degree expectations, race,
high school region, mother and father￿ s education, and income. Finally, we average the pre-
dicted transition probabilities across individuals in each respective high school GPA quintile.
The probability transition matrix values are
￿(￿h j ￿c) =
2
6
6 6 6 6 6
4
0:41 0:24 0:18 0:12 0:05
0:29 0:23 0:21 0:17 0:10
0:19 0:20 0:23 0:22 0:16
0:12 0:16 0:22 0:25 0:25
0:05 0:10 0:17 0:26 0:42
3
7
7 7 7 7 7
5
:
where ￿ij represents the probability of a newborn in the ith ability quintile drawing a college
ability in the jth quintile.
4.4 College
On average, a bachelor￿ s degree in the U.S. requires a student to complete 120 credit hours.
For computational purposes, we scale down the credit choice set so that one model credit
corresponds to 10 credit hours. Thus, the graduation credit requirement is x = 12: The
returns to e⁄ort in terms of credits produces is dictated by the curvature of the credit
production technology. Because our credit accumulation function is analogous to the human
capital accumulation function we set ￿ = 0:70; a standard parameterization in the literature.
The remaining college parameters are related to the ￿nancial aspect of higher education.
In the 1992-93 school year, tuition and fees represented only 40 percent of the estimated
total annual cost at public 4-year institutions.11 It is important to accurately measure the
total direct cost of college as the in￿ uence of credit constraints may be biased downward
otherwise. Therefore, our measure of tuition is average tuition, fees, and room and board
charges at public four-year institutions during the 1992-3 school year as reported by College
Board (2006) measured on a per-credit basis consistent with our model units. This measure
11Tuition and fees were $2,334 compared to total chares of $5,834.
22of tuition more completely re￿ ects the total direct cost of attending college than simply
using tuition. As with assets, we express the per-credit cost of college T as a fraction of
young college graduates￿wage.12 We ￿nd that the per-credit cost of college is approximately 7
percent of a young college graduate￿ s wage calculated using the 1994 March CPS supplement.
In the benchmark estimation we set T =0:07wg
y:
Per-period grants y are estimated using the 1992-93 National Postsecondary Student Aid
Study. Our measure of grants is designed to account for the wide range of ￿nancial aid
available to students in addition to student loans. Grants are computed as the average sum
of all federal, state, institutional, and other grants and scholarships. As a percent of a young
college graduate￿ s wage, we ￿nd total grants to be 5.18 percent. Therefore, in the benchmark
estimation y = 0:0518wg
y per period.
Table 1: 1992-1993 Sta⁄ord Loan Annual Loan Limits
Class Level Loan Limit (Data) Period Loan Limit (Model)
First & Second Year $2,625 First ￿0:17wc
y
Third & Fourth Year $2,625 Second ￿0:42wc
y
Fifth Year $4,000 Third ￿0:67wc
y
Per-period borrowing constraints are chosen to match as closely as possible the Federal
Sta⁄ord Loan Program as it existed during the 1992-93 academic school year. Since our
model of college corresponds to a maximum of six years, but students may only participate
in the federal loan program for up to ￿ve years, we restrict the amount a student may borrow
if they take three periods. As with tuition and grants we must convert the empirical loan
limits into model units. Again, this is done by expressing benchmark loan limits as a fraction
of the young college graduates wage. In table 1 we present the loan limits used in the model
along with their empirical counterparts.
Under the federal program students repayment does not begin until after leaving school.
To mimic this feature of the student loan program we have adjusted the loan limits to allow
for cumulative debt a to be rolled over each period. The ￿nal student loan parameter relates
to the repayment of debt after leaving school. The standard repayment plan under the
federal program is ten years which can be approximated by setting the fraction of debt that
maybe rolled over each period after entering the workforce ￿ to be 0:50:
12To account for the fact that we have scaled the 120 credit hour degree requirement down by twelve, we
also adjust the per-credit cost of college before expressing in terms of wages.
234.5 Production Function
The production function has a total of ten parameters. In addition, we must specify the
depreciation rate which we choose as ￿ = 0:06. Capital￿ s share of income ￿ is set to 0.36.
We normalize the aggregate productivity parameter A to unity. The elasticity of substitution
between high school and college workers ￿E; and the elasticity of substitution between young
and old workers ￿A pin down the parameters ￿ and ’: Card and Lemieux (2001) estimate
the elasticity of substitution between high school and college educated workers to be about
2.5, and the elasticity of substitution between young and old workers to be around 5. Using
these estimates and the fact that ￿ = 1 ￿ 1=￿E and ’ = 1 ￿ 1=￿A; we set ￿ = 0:60 and
’ = 0:80:
The remaining productivity parameters (￿y;￿o; y; o;AH;AG) were estimated as follows.































The ratio of productivity units determines the the various age and skill premiums in the
economy. Because the premiums are relative we can set  y = ￿y = AH = 1. Thus, given
our choices for ￿ and ’, and values for average wages and aggregate labor supply which
we calculate from the 1994 March CPS supplement using the method of Card and Lemieux
(2001), equations(19) ￿ (21) provide us with estimates for the three remaining parameters.
These were found to be ￿o = 1:29;  o = 1:68; and AC = 1:37:
5 Estimation and Model Evaluation
Using a minimum distance approach we estimate the model￿ s three remaining parameters:
the relative importance of retirement wealth ￿R; and the two parameters relating to the
college dropout wage, ￿ and p. The parameters are chosen so that the following three
aggregate economic statistics produced in the baseline economy comes as close as possible to
those of the educational environment of the early 1990s in the U.S. while at the same time
respecting the market clearing conditions.
Enrollment and dropout rates: The ￿rst two statistics that we target are the college
enrollment rate and college dropout rate. Enrollment and dropout rates are nontrivial to
24calculate because of the many ways to de￿ne them. Our model is best used to study ￿rst-
time college students considering a four-year college path. To keep our targets in-line with
our model, we choose to target the enrollment and dropout rates corresponding to these
students. According to the BLS, 62 percent of recent high school graduates enrolled in college
(broadly de￿ned) in 1993. Nearly two-thirds (64 percent) of these students enrolled in 4-year
institutions. Thus, we choose the enrollment rate target to be 40 percent. Gladieux and
Perna￿ s (2005) use the Beginning Postsecondary Students data (BPS) to estimate the college
dropout rate for ￿rst time students. The authors classify anyone who has not graduated by
the end of the sixth year of the study as a dropout. In reality, a good portion of those
students still in school after six years will eventually graduate. Using the tables provided in
their paper a range of 24%-39% can be placed on the real dropout rate depending on the
graduation/dropout assumption of students still in school at the end of the study. We chose
a benchmark dropout target rate of 26%, well within in the range of the real dropout rate.
Time-to-Degree: The third target is time-to-degree at four-year colleges and univer-
sities. We rely on the recent empirical work of Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner (2006) that
focuses on this often neglected topic. Similar to the problem with accurately calculating
dropout rates, time-to-degree estimates su⁄er from the data￿ s failure to track every entering
student until they complete their degree. Bound, Lovenheim, and Turner (2006) use the
National Educational Longitudinal Study of 1988 to estimate the time-to-degree for the high
school class of 1992 that ￿rst enrolled at non-top 50 4-year institutions at 5.23 years. This
value is most likely lower than the actually time to degree because they condition on having
received a B.A. within eight years of entering. However this horizon is su¢ ciently long that
their estimate should not be far from the true mean. Thus, the benchmark time-to-degree
target is set to 5.23 years.
In table 2 we summarize the benchmark estimation results. The top panel shows how
well the model performs compared to our chosen targets, while the middle panel presents
the corresponding parameter estimates.
25Table 2: Estimation of the Model (Annualized Values)
Statistic Target Model
Enrollment Rate 40.0% 39.6%
Dropout Rate 26.0% 27.8%
Time-to-Degree 5.2 years 5.4 years
Variable Parameter Value
Return to partial education ￿ 0.86
Prob. of return to partial education p 0.92
Continuation value factor ￿R 3.68
Overall, the model performs well relative to the educational statistics calculated from
the data. In the baseline economy the enrollment rate is 39.6 percent, whereas the empirical
counterpart at four-year institutions is 40.0 percent. The model￿ s predicted dropout rate
is slightly higher than the target in the data 27.8 percent versus 26.0 percent. However,
the obtained ￿gure is within the range of estimates of Gladieux and Perna￿ s (2005). With
respect to our last estimation target we ￿nd that the model is consistent with an average
time-to-degree of within 2 months and 12 days of that calculated by Bound, Lovenheim, and
Turner (2006). To put this di⁄erence in perspective, consider that the benchmark time-to-
degree is within the terms of a regular academic quarter of that found in Bound, Lovenheim,
and Turner (2006). The parameters controlling the dropout wage rate reveal that the college
dropout wages is determined as a 86/14 percent weighted average of the high school wage
and college wage, respectively. However, the model￿ s predicted probability of receiving the
dropout wage is only 8 percent. These two parameters combined are consistent with the fact
that the return to partial education is much closer to that of high school graduates wage
than to a college graduates wage.
Since we use a production function with heterogenous labor inputs it is interesting to
explore the implied wage premiums that result from the parameterized baseline model.
Wage rates, or more speci￿cally wage premium, are a key factor determining enrollment
and dropout rates. The wage rates in the model do not represent an agent￿ s net return to
education. Calculating the return to education is complicated by other factors that vary
across individuals such as the initial assets and the agent￿ s ￿nancing choice. For individuals
that have su¢ cient resources at hand the cost of education is lower than those that need
to use student loans which require interest payments. With this in mind, table 3 below
compares the following skill and age premiums produced by the model with those found in
the data: college to high school skill premium wg=wh; the college age premium wc
o=wc
y; and
26the high school age premium wh
o=wh
c. It is important to be aware that the wage premiums
are the result of solving for the equilibrium and are not targeted in the estimation procedure.
Table 3: Wage Premiums by Age
Wage Premium Ages Data Model
College Skill Premium (wg=wh) 18-65 1:87 1.82
College Age Premium (wg
o=wg
y) 24-65 1:55 1.52
High School Age Premium (wh
o=wh
c) 18-35 1:27 1.25
Data source: Current Population Survey (March Supplements)
The wage premiums implied by the model are consistent with their empirical counterparts
calculated using the March CPS. For example the model predicts a college skill premium
of 1.82 compared to an empirical skill premium of 1.87.13 The college age premium is
determined by the ratio of wages of college graduates that are between ages 36 and 65 and
those between ages 24 and 35. This feature captures the upward slopping pro￿le of earnings
over the life-cycle. This upward trend in wages over time within education groups is also
found in high school graduates as indicated by a high school age premium of 1.27 in the
model. The model￿ s capacity to replicate certain features from the data without directly
targeting them is certainly important if we are to use this model for policy analysis.14
6 Education Policy
In this section we explore the impact of various education policies on the incentives to enroll
in college, extend time in school, and drop out. Predicting the a⁄ects of education policy
in our model is complicated by several features. First, the structure of the ￿nancial aid
package o⁄ered interacts with each agent￿ s existing resources, borrowing constraints, ability,
and time endowment which must be allocated optimally among e⁄ort required, labor supply,
and leisure. Second, we model college as a multi-period lumpy investment. The restriction on
students that credits may only be chosen in a discrete fashion prevents them from adjusting
their investment decision in a continuos manner in response to policies. In turn, this requires
that policy interventions be of su¢ cient size to a⁄ect behavior across the various behavioral
margins. Third, the correlation between ability and ￿nancial resources is likely to impact
13Because there are two age speci￿c labor inputs for each education level, the skill premium is the ratio








14For computational reasons these parameters have not been estimated. The cost of solving the model with
the degree of accuracy needed for policy analysis is relatively large. Given the model success of replicating
the wage premiums we view the approach as the only viable alternative.
27the behavior of lower income students who are also from the bottom end of the ability
distribution. At the same time there general equilibrium e⁄ects in the labor markets that
encourage targeted students to enter the labor market without obtaining a college education.
It is our contention that the complexity of the model is what makes it ideal for studying
the role of education policy intervention. The majority of our analysis is focused on policies
that a⁄ect the cost of tuition and change the size of government provided grants. In contrast
with Gallipoli, Meghir, and Violante (2006) who assume a single arbitrary change in the size
the education program, we consider the impact of tuition and grant policies across a range
education program sizes. The advantage of this approach is that allows to determine the
e⁄ectiveness of each program to impact the decisions of college students across the various
behavioral margins.
6.1 Tuition
In this section we turn our attention to comparing three di⁄erent tuition programs: a pure
subsidy program, a merit based tuition subsidy, and ￿ at tuition rate policy. Under the pure
subsidy program the per credit tuition price faced by students in each period of college is
T ￿ = (1 ￿ ￿)T , where ￿ is the per credit subsidy. The remaining cost of subsidizing tuition
￿T is ￿nanced by tax revenue collected from workers. Instead of specifying the subsidy
rate explicitly we ￿x the aggregate education budget at a percent above the zero subsidy
baseline education budget and then calculate the resulting per credit subsidy. This allows us
to precisely control the education budget under di⁄erent increases. Because we do not allow
for government debt all increases in government expenditures as a result of an increase in
educational spending must be ￿nanced through current tax revenue. In order to gauge the
magnitude of increase in the education budget that would be needed to signi￿cantly alter
college behavior we implement the pure subsidy program under a 20 percent, 100 percent,
and 150 percent increase of the baseline budget.
The merit based tuition programs condition the tuition subsidy on the completion of at
least x￿ credits in the ￿rst year in college. Students that meet or exceed this merit based
quali￿cation requirement receive a one time tuition subsidy in the second period. For brevity
the merit based program is carried out under only a doubling of the education budget. To
qualify for the subsidy students are required to complete 50 credits (or 5 model credits) in
the ￿rst period of college. Meeting the ￿rst period credit requirement places the student
on a path to graduate in under 5 years. Formally, the merit based tuition function that





(1 ￿ ￿)T if x ￿ x￿
T if x < x￿
Our last tuition experiment is the introduction of a ￿ at tuition rate equal to the product
of the baseline per credit tuition price and graduation credit requirement, T x. Thus, the ￿ at
tuition assumes that the cost of education is independent of the number of credits registered
for, but still equal to the total cost under per credit pricing and a four year college path. In
table 5 below, we present the results of the three di⁄erent tuition policy experiments.
Table 5: Tuition Based Policies
Tuition Subsidy Program by Size Merit Flat
Education Statistic Baseline 20% 100% 150% Based (100%) Tuition
Enrollment Rate 39.62% 41.33% 44.01% 46.71% 40.35% 31.23%
Dropout Rate 27.84% 28.47% 28.73% 29.31% 23.88% 15.04%
Time-to-Degree (years) 5.39 5.37 5.61 5.73 5.35 4.78
Subsidy (￿) 0% 4.94% 24.03% 32.69% 67.50% 0%
Expenditures/GDP 1.62% 1.91% 3.14% 3.89% 3.09 1.20%
Labor Market
Fraction Skilled Labor 28.14% 28.95% 30.69% 32.27% 29.59% 26.35%
College Skill Premium (wg=wh) 1.82 1.79 1.73 1.67 1.77 1.89




y) 1.52 1.52 1.51 1.50 1.52 1.53
H.S. Age Premium (wh
o=wh
c) 1.25 1.25 1.24 1.21 1.25 1.25
The aggregate e⁄ects on education point towards an adverse selection problem resulting
from implementing uniform tuition subsidies as it does not appear possible to simultaneously
increase enrollment and reduce dropouts. While lowering the cost of school enables some of
the poorer students to enroll and eventually complete their degree, it also encourages less
well prepared students to attempt college stemming from the correlation between wealth
and ability. The result is an improvement in enrollment, but a deterioration in the comple-
tion rate. Notice though that time-to-degree is not an monotonically increasing function of
subsidy expenditures. Comparing the baseline economy with the 20 percent tuition subsidy
experiment we see a relatively ￿ at response in time-to-degree. While tuition is subsidized,
the subsidy is too small to prevent dropping out and extending time in school. Thus, only
29students that graduated in the baseline economy graduate when spending is increased mod-
erately by 20 percent, and their decision to prolong school is minimally impacted. Further
expenditure increases cause time-to-degree to increase in part because a fraction of students
that were on the margin of dropping out are now able to complete their degree. In addition,
as mentioned previously, newly enrolled students from the lower end of the ability distribu-
tion will require longer than average to ￿nish college. An increase in time spent in college
equal to one semester results from a 150 percent increase in the baseline education budget.
Turning to the labor market we see improvements with respect to the composition of the
labor force and wage inequality. Not surprisingly the 150 percent budget increase generates
the largest decrease in the skill premium equal to 8.2 percent versus a decrease of 5 percent
with a 100 percent increase, and only 1.65 percent resulting from a 20 percent spending
increase. The within education group age premium are relatively ￿ at across subsidy experi-
ment although a slight compression in wages occurs for high school educated workers under
the 150 percent expenditure increase. As more young college eligible agents enroll in college
their must be a general equilibrium e⁄ect incentivizing some students to enter the labor
market without a higher education.
Conditional on enrolling in college, the government has no ability in our model to directly
observe ability. As we have seen this leads tuition subsidies to simultaneously increase the
enrollment rate and dropout rate. While the skilled labor force increases, indicating that
the enrollment e⁄ect dominates the dropout e⁄ect, it may be possible to screen students
requiring ￿nancial aid and positively in￿ uence the completion rate. One popular method of
doing this is by o⁄ering merit based aid. The potential downside of such a policy is that the
correlation between assets and ability makes it unlikely that for a given increase in spending,
a merit based policy will be able to solicit the same enrollment response as uniform tuition
subsidies while at the same time improving attrition. Looking at the results from a 100
percent expenditure increase directed into merit based subsidies we see this to indeed be
the case. Relative to the benchmark economy enrollment does rise although the increase
is modest. More importantly is the signi￿cant decrease in college dropouts; a 14.2 percent
when compared to the benchmark .
An alternative to merit based aid that allows for partial screening of students by ability
is the introduction of a ￿ at tuition pricing strategy. In this experiment we assume that the
cost of education is a ￿ at tuition fee independent of the number of credits registered T :
Ignoring class congestion, this type of credit pricing implicitly subsidizes individuals that
have incentives to proceed through college quickly (wealthy, high ability agents), from those
that require more time (poorer, low ability). As a result we would expect to see a reduction
in enrollment, time in school, and the dropout from the introduction of a ￿xed cost to
30enrollment. In-line with this reasoning, the model predicts a dramatic reduction in the
aggregate enrollment rate, the number of college dropouts, and the time to degree compared
to the baseline pricing policy. The results suggest that instituting a ￿ at tuition rate equal
to cost for a normal four year student would reduce enrollment by 21.2 percent. Due to the
correlation between ￿nancial resources and ability the students that due enroll are better o⁄
￿nancially and in terms of ability. The interaction between the two leads this type of pricing
strategy to be very e⁄ective in generating completed degrees, and reducing dropouts time-to-
degree. Speci￿cally, time-to-degree is reduced 11.2 percent while the number of dropouts are
nearly cut in half. Despite the increase in the graduation rate, the reduced fraction students
enrolling results in increased wage inequality as indicated by the skill premium.
An important caveat relating to the ￿ at tuition policy as implemented in our model
must be discussed. It appears as though instituting a ￿ at tuition pricing strategy reduces
aggregate educational expenditures as a percent of GDP. However, in all actuality we would
expect there to be the need for institutional subsidies in order to induce universities to adopt
such a policy. Thus, focus should be given more towards the a⁄ect such a policy has on the
behavior of student than it does on budget or behavior of universities.
The experiments suggest that if the objective of education policy is to increase enroll-
ment, uniform tuition subsidies seem to be moderately e⁄ective depending on the amount
of resources allocated to education. Tuition subsidies change the relative price of education
and as a result students consume more education credits. The downside of the policy is that
since on net more marginal ability students choose to participate the number of dropouts
and time to degree increases. Merit based programs appear to provide better incentives to
complete college, although the a⁄ect on enrollment and time-to-degree is small. The main
reason is that less able students do not bene￿t from the merit based tuition reduction. As a
result, the program only bene￿ts a subset of the student population that is capable of com-
pleting the minimum number of credits. A ￿ at rate tuition policy would be most e⁄ective if
the objective is to reduce the number of college dropouts and time-to-degree. Unfortunately,
instituting such a policy would have severe negative implications for enrollment and wage in-
equality. The model suggests that an education policy that simultaneously wants to increase
enrollment and reduce the number of dropouts and time to degree has to combine tuition
subsidies for a self-selected groups of students with ￿ at tuition for the remaining. This pric-
ing strategy would eliminate the apparent trade-o⁄ between enrollment and dropout rates
of more simple education policies.
316.2 Grants
Grants and scholarship are a popular way of providing students with alternatives to working
or borrowing while in school. The two main types of grants and scholarships are need based
and merit based. Regardless of the type of grant, they di⁄er in one fundamental way from
tuition based policies. As we discussed previously, tuition subsidies change the relative price
of education and in turn generate both a substitution and income e⁄ect. On the other hand,
a change in size of grants available to students is only associated with a income e⁄ect. As a
result, grants to do not necessarily provide the same incentives to tilt more of ones budget
towards direct educational expenditures and away from leisure. While an individual subject
to an increase in ￿nancial resources can a⁄ord to purchase more credits they are also able
to consume more leisure. But an increase in leisure lessens the amount available for work
and e⁄ort. Thus it is unclear if grants have the features necessary to improve upon tuition
subsidies. In the case of need based grants, they may be an e⁄ective tool for increasing
enrollment by allowing poor students to enroll, take a few credits and then allocate the
majority of their time to work and leisure. But just as grants may create large enrollment
incentives, so too may they result in a large number of dropouts due to the correlation of
￿nancial assets and schooling ability. Compared to need based grants we would expect merit
based grants to carry with them a more moderate enrollment response, and hopefully an
improvement in college completion.
Similar to the previous section on tuition policies, we employ the use of our model to
explore the consequences of instituting a uniform increase in grant spending as well as to-
wards a merit based program. Under the uniform grant policy all students experience an
increase in their per period grant. For comparability to the tuition subsidy experiments we
increase the educational budget 20 percent, 100 percent, and 150 percent, and then solve
for the corresponding new per period grant that makes the aggregate increase attainable.
Again, every increase in educational spending is ￿nanced by an increase in the lump-sum
tax charged to workers. For simplicity we only institute the merit grant program under a
100 percent increase. Merit based grants are only provided during the second period. In
order to receive the merit based grant each student complete x￿ credits by the end of the
￿rst period. Students that fail to achieve the minimum number of credits only receive the
benchmark grant. The results of the various policy experiments are summarized in table 9.
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Grant Program by Size Merit
Education Statistic Baseline 20% 100% 150% Grant (100%)
Enrollment Rate 39.62% 41.05% 51.42% 55.53% 39.65%
Dropout Rate 27.84% 29.10% 39.93% 42.88% 22.70%
Time-to-Degree (years) 5.39 5.46 5.58 5.80 5.63
Grants (% of 4-year college cost) 13.15% 15.09% 21.79% 25.02% 55.71%
Expenditures/GDP 1.62% 1.93% 3.16% 3.92% 3.19%
Labor Market
Fraction Skilled Labor 28.14% 28.60% 30.26 30.94% 29.29%
College Skill Premium (wg=wh) 1.82 1.80 1.74 1.72 1.76




y) 1.52 1.51 1.51 1.51 1.51
High School Age Premium (wh
o=wh
c) 1.25 1.25 1.24 1.24 1.24
By comparing the response to uniform grants to that of tuition based policies we ￿nd
that grants face the same general trade-o⁄s as tuition subsidies. The increase in grant
spending has a positive e⁄ect on the enrollment rate, but it also increases the dropout rate
and the time to degree. Immediately though we see a much greater response in enrollment
and dropout behavior to large increases in spending directed towards grants than to tuition
subsidies. While the enrollment responses with uniform grants are similar to those of a
tuition subsidy under a 20 percent aggregate expenditure, a doubling or more in education
spending leads to approximately a 17 to 19 percent increase in enrollment over that seen
with tuition subsidies. The same holds true in terms of drop out behavior. Uniform grants
increased the dropout rate 39 to 46 percent more than tuition subsidies do under the two
largest budget increases. While we do not model the interaction between skill acquisition
and employment risk in this paper, Gladieux and Perna￿ s (2005) document higher rates of
unemployment for college dropouts. Thus, uniform grants may be even more detrimental
when the employment of college dropouts is considered.
The bene￿t of increased enrollment does not appear to translate in vast improvements
in the skill composition of the labor force or wage inequality. When compared to tuition
subsidies, grants are marginally worse along these two dimensions. In addition, the relative
budgetary cost of implementing a broad based grant program increases (in terms of GDP).
Only if the goal of public policy is to target enrollment should uniform grants alone be
encouraged over uniform tuition subsidies.
Turning attention towards the merit based grant program we see that relative to the
benchmark, the enrollment response is quite ￿ at while college completion is signi￿cantly
33improved upon. The improvement in competition comes at the small cost of extending the
average time needed to ￿nish school by less than 3 months. As the result of more students
graduating the fraction of skilled workers increases. Wage inequality between skilled and
unskilled workers is reduced due to the general equilibrium e⁄ects of more college graduates.
When compared to the merit based tuition program we ￿nd similar results along most
dimensions. The tuition program preforms marginally better with respect to enrollment and
total cost while the grant program improves slightly upon the dropout rate. Notice however
that the relative price e⁄ect of merit based tuition subsidies forces students to direct more
expenditures towards college credits and appears to explain the improvement in time-to-
degree relative to the merit based grant program.
6.3 Loan Limit
The existence and magnitude of borrowing constraints has been a point of contention for
some time. Carneiro and Heckman (2002) contend that at most 8 percent of the U.S.
population is credit constrained when it comes to post-secondary education. In the absence
of unanimous agreement, the most common approach taken by researchers has been to make
assumptions about borrowing constraints and proceed. For example, Caucutt and Kumar
(2003) assume that all borrowing for human capital investment is prohibited while Akyol
and Athreya (2005) always allow agents to borrow enough to cover their education. Recently
Keane and Wolpin (2001) and Keane (2002) have suggested that borrowing limits interact in
an important way with labor supply. If students are allowed to work in addition to borrow
than any tightening of education related loan limits work primarily through the labor-supply
margin and not the enrollment margin. We investigate this conclusion further by tightening
loan limits with and without allowing agents to work while in school. This extends the work
of Keane and Wolpin (2001) who only allow students three work options: no work, part-
time work, and full-time work. As in Keane (2002), agents in our model are permitted to
continuously adjust their labor supply. However in Keane (2002) there is no heterogeneity
amongst individuals.
34Table 10: Loan Limits and Labor Supply
Loan Limit Reduction: Baseline 15% 15% 40% 40% 60% 60%
Work in College: X X X X
Education Statistic
Enrollment Rate 39.62% 39.43% 39.12% 38.71% 38.31% 37.73% 33.94%
Dropout Rate 27.8% 28.50% 25.83% 29.31% 26.27% 29.77% 26.83%
Time-to-Degree (years) 5.39 5.45 5.25 5.60 5.24 5.61 5.21
In table 10 we present the results from reducing the baseline loan limits with and without
allowing students to work. While enrollment does fall somewhat when borrowing limits are
tightened, it is only when loan limits are reduced by over half of their baseline amount and
the work option is removed do we see a signi￿cant enrollment e⁄ect. Removing the work
option and reducing borrowing limits by 60 percents leads to a nearly 6 percentage point
(14 percent) decline in enrollment from the baseline. Allowing the agent to work to ￿nance
his education in face of such a drastic reduction in available credit mitigates the enrollment
response. Students must commit more time to work and as a results we see an increase in
time to degree and the dropout rate.
Reducing the borrowing constraint by anything less than 60 percent only marginally im-
pacts enrollment. This holds whether individuals are permitted to work or not. Interestingly,
when students do not have the option to work we see a decrease in both the dropout rate and
the time needed to complete college. Students borrow more to cover the lost labor income,
but now since their time is only allocated between school and leisure they are able to commit
more time to school.
The results are interesting and compare to those of Keane (2002). They suggest that
ignoring the labor supply of college students when studying borrowing constraints can lead to
erroneous results, especially when the focus is on the severity of credit constraints. Nominal
aggregate loan limits under the federal student loan program increased approximately 33
percent in the early 1990s. The failure to index the loan limits to in￿ ation and the rise
in tuition since then has resulted in real loan limits below those of the early 1990s. While
enrollment has not su⁄ered we do know that more and more students are working to ￿nance
their education and are taking longer to complete their schooling. The labor supply/loan
limit interaction may be able to explain at least part of this phenomenon.
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In this paper we develop a quantitative theory of college education which is embedded within
the context of general equilibrium overlapping generations economy. We depart from the
standard human capital literature and model college as a multi-period risky investment with
endogenous enrollment, time-to-degree, and dropout behavior. The tuition expenditures
required to complete college can be funded using federal grants, student loans, and working
while in college. We use the model to test the e⁄ectiveness of three distinct education policies:
tuition subsidies (broad based, merit based, and ￿ at tuition), grant subsidies (broad based
and merit based), and loan limit restrictions (with and without endogenous in-school labor
supply). Our model predicts that broad based tuition subsidies and grants increase college
enrollment. However, due to the correlation between ability and ￿nancial resources most
of these new students are from the lower end of the ability distribution and eventually
dropout or take longer than average to complete college. Merit based education policies
counteract this adverse selection problem but at the cost of a muted enrollment response.
We ￿nd that tuition programs perform marginally better with respect to enrollment, time
to degree, and total cost while grant based programs improves slightly upon dropouts. The
￿nal policy experiment highlights an important interaction between borrowing constraints
and the labor supply of college students. The baseline model is consistent with the ￿ndings
of Cameron and Heckman (1998, 1999) and Keane and Wolpin (2001) that ￿nd short term
liquidity constraints play no signi￿cant role in college attendance decisions. Nevertheless,
a signi￿cant decrease in enrollment is found to occur only when borrowing constraints are
severely tighten and the option to work while in school is removed. This result suggests that
previous models that have ignored the student￿ s labor supply when analyzing borrowing
constraints may be lacking and insu¢ cient for understanding the impact of education policy.
In a situation where the government has no information about student ability or college
performance, we ￿nd that a signi￿cant adverse selection problem that prevents broad-based
education policies (tuition subsidies and grant) from simultaneously increasing enrollment
and reducing the number of dropouts and time to degree. However, there may exist merit
based programs that would eliminate the apparent trade-o⁄between enrollment and dropout
rates of the uniform education policies. We leave the study of all these policies for future
research.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Computational Procedures
The computation of the student problem is very complex as it is not concave. As a result,
the ￿rst-order conditions cannot be used. To avoid any problem we have opted for the
discretization of the two continuos state variables: ability, and student loans/￿nancial assets.
We have found that a uniform distribution over ability coupled with our kernel density
estimates for the mass of agents approximates the true ability distribution extremely well.
The asset grid is not equally spaced. We have added more grid points when the grid in
assets is negative and near the borrowing constraints. We use the recursive structure of the
problem to solve the model backwards from the terminal condition and construct the value
function and the optimal decision rules.
38The complexity of the computation also increases because we have to solve the consumer
problem and calculate the equilibrium many times to guarantee that markets clear and the
model statistics are consistent with the chosen targets. Since the model has to clear six
markets we place more weight on the market clearing conditions than on the parameteriza-
tion targets. The equilibrium and model statistics are solved using nonlinear least squares.
The objective function to minimize has two distinct components: the model equilibrium
conditions and the parameter values that best ￿t the data. Let ￿ be the vector of model
























j+1(￿j+1) represents the equilibrium price calculated with parameters ￿j+1 in itera-
tion j + 1; and F n(￿) represents the model statistics that need to match their counter part
in the data F n:
The indirect inference procedure proceeds as follows:
￿ Guess a vector of parameters ￿ and a vector of equilibrium prices p(￿)
￿ Solve the household￿ s problem to obtain the value function and decision rules.
￿ Given the policy functions, calculate the implied invariant distribution ￿(￿); the im-
plied aggregates fF ngN
n=1 and equilibrium prices fpk(￿)g6
k=1:
￿ Calculate L(￿); and ￿nd the estimator of b ￿ and the implied equilibrium prices b p(￿)
that solves minimize the objective function.
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